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Philosophy in Africa has come a long way. From the 18th and 19th centuries when it 
was totally ignored or denied altogether, to when it was given a lower status by 
ethnophilosophers. Today we talk proudly of an African philosophy. What is often 
forgotten is its history and the players behind its h storical moments. This paper tells 
the story of how racial ideology had defined the course of philosophy in Africa. We 
are particularly concerned with telling the story of Henry Odera Oruka, and how he 
contributed to raising the status of philosophy in Africa. 
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Since the publication of Bantu Philosophy by the Belgian Missionary Placide 
Tempels, a lot has been written concerning African Philosophy. Tempels’ book 
sought to bring to an end the ‘controversy’ over the existence or non-existence of a 
philosophy among the ‘primitive peoples’. This however led to the beginning of yet 
another controversial discourse within African Philosophy revolving around the 
question: why did Tempels ascribe to Africans an inferior philosophy? Why did he 
find it necessary to assert that African philosophy is different from western 
philosophy? The answer lies in the racial relationship between whites and blacks - 
what we shall refer to as the ideology of race. 
 
We set out by examining the pioneering efforts on African philosophy. Our inquiry 
then confronts the question: what triggered the need for African self-definition? Next, 
we look at Oruka’s identification of six theories in African Philosophy, and reflect on 
how they clarify the nature of Philosophy in Africa.  We focus on the third theory, 
sage philosophy, for the reason that Prof Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2002) has identified 
the evolution of the theory from sage philosophy to philosophic sagacity. Our 
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conclusion is that the course of philosophy in Africa has been determined by racial 
ideology. 
 
Tempels and the Setting of African Philosophy 
Due to his Bantu Philosophy (1959), Placide Tempels has been honored for having 
brought forth the first piece of literature concerning “Bantu (African) Philosophy” 
into academic philosophical discussion (see Masolo 1995, 46; Masolo 2010, 144, 196, 
33-34; Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2009, 44; Oruka 1990, 1). Tempels ‘discovered’ a 
philosophy among the Bantu, getting the honor, again, of being the first scholar of 
European origin to stand up against the 18th and 19th Century European rationalism 
and logo-centricism, in which only Europeans could produce a philosophy that was 
both human and rational. Hegel (1956, 99) represents the height of this trend of 
thought. 
 
The story of Tempels’ contribution to the discourse on African philosophy has been 
told so many times that it has become practically impossible to hold a meaningful 
conversation on African philosophy without mentioning the ideas contained in Bantu 
Philosophy. This is true for those who support his position on philosophy in Africa as 
well as those critical of them (See Mbiti 1969, 10,213; Oruka 1990, 1, 5-6, 114-118; 
Masolo 1994, 39, 42, 46-49; Hountondji 1996, 15-17, 34-37, 48-49, 56-57; Appiah 
1992, 94). 
 
A number of scholars have highlighted the positive contributions of Tempels’ 
pioneering work in African Philosophy, with one of the best examples of this 
evaluation being found in Mbiti (1969). Others find his language paternalistic and 
overbearing (Hountondji 1996, 34-37). Those sympathetic to his views are referred to 
as ethnophilosophers (Oruka 1990, 5-7, 23-24). Those who regard his work as falling 
below the threshold of what should pass as philosophical are referred to as 
professional philosophers (Oruka 1990; Masolo 1994; Hountondji 1996; Appiah 
1992; Mudimbe 1988). This polarity is at the core of the struggle to control the 
direction of philosophy in Africa. Fearing that this struggle might obliterate all the 
gains made in African philosophy, Oruka proposed meiation via sage philosophy. In 
a paper titled “Sagacity in African Philosophy” first published in The International 
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Philosophical Quarterly (1983), and republished in Oruka’s Trends in Contemporary 
African Philosophy (1990), he observes: 
Although the phenomenon of ethnophilosophy persists in various 
forms, we are currently in a new phase, the phase of professional 
philosophy …. One remarkable characteristic of thisphilosophy is that 
it employs techniques commonly associated with European or Western 
philosophy. Yet, contrary to the general claim, such techniques are not 
unique to the West (Oruka 1990, 35). 
Oruka was worried that professional philosophers in Africa were becoming too meta-
philosophical, demanding of African philosophy parameters that were unrealistically 
high. In addition, because professional philosophers’ challenge to ethnophilosophy 
was becoming a threat to the development of philosophy in Africa, Oruka advised that 
the problem “calls for the current African and black philosophers to ‘let one hundred 
flowers bloom.’ The future will sort out those flowers and preserve a tradition” 
(Oruka 1990, 36). 
 
For a long time, the question of the direction of African philosophy was resolved by 
attempts at demonstrating a racial rational ability or lack of it. It was a question of 
whether or not Africans have the same rational ability as Europeans. This rationality 
debate left one with a comparison based on an assumption that those who developed a 
philosophy or philosophies were better than those who did not. This is the absurd part 
of conversations in African philosophy, since the existence or non-existence of a 
philosophy does not and cannot establish rationality s an exclusive possession of any 
one culture (Oruka 1990, 14-15). 
 
The question that one should address is whether philosophy is equivalent to 
rationality, and in defining philosophy as love of wisdom, whether or not all wise 
persons are philosophers; and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether or not the 
converse is true. Looking at the history of philosophy from Thales, through Plato, 
Aristotle, down to contemporary time, it is clear that philosophical views belong to 
individual critical thinkers, men and women who reflect on reality, social and natural, 
in a bid to transform, modify, or even reject current xplanation. The philosopher’s 
task is to rearrange knowledge. Tempels and the entire ethno philosophical school 
failed to see this in African philosophy. Their version of African philosophy is rich in 
content but scarce in individual input. Their theoretical framework fails the test of the 
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relationship between a philosophy and the philosopher. In this scheme, we have an 
African philosophy without a corresponding African philosopher. Who will own these 
truths? Who will defend these philosophical positions? Tempels has no answer. 
 
In The Mind of Africa, William Abraham (1962) makes a distinction between a 
‘public philosophy’ and a ‘private philosophy’. The former he says is concerned with 
the traditional society, laying bare the communal mind. The latter is concerned with 
the thinking of individual philosophers (Abraham 1962, 104). To paraphrase 
Abraham, the African has his own conception of the universe, and his philosophy and 
life activities are based on this conception, which is a metaphysical view of the world 
as seen from the traditional society. Here Abraham is in agreement with Kwasi 
Wiredu, who identifies two phases in the evolution of society: traditional and modern 
(Wiredu 1980, 4, 16, 36). 
 
The traditional phase presents a folk or pre-scientif c view of life. This folk system of 
thought includes but is not limited to original unwritten proverbs, maxims, and 
palavers among others. It presents a closed system whose truths are insulated from 
external interference, and are justified exclusively within the system. These truths are 
defended, sometimes irrationally, and in any conflict with other truths, the system’s 
truths always prevail. This phase of society has a philosophy relevant to the time of its 
operation. For Wiredu (1980), this is the right place for ethnophilosophy. 
 
As society evolves, new epistemologies emerge, informing new technologies leading 
to the development in science. The latter disrupts the traditional set up, transforming 
the society. The traditional set up becomes irrelevant to the modern society, which 
adopts modern patterns of living. The modern society is open to criticism. It uses 
logic, and is characterised by acceptance based on rati al considerations and not the 
dictates of tradition (Wiredu 1980, 36). 
 
Since Tempels’ pioneering work, many have contributed to entrenching his approach 
by describing various aspects of African culture in the name of philosophy. Reading 
some of these works, one is left wondering whether or not there exists an African 
philosophy distinct from an African culture. The problem partly lies in the fact that it 
is not clear what the methodological and conceptual paradigms within which African 
152 Francis E.A. Owakah 
 
philosophical discourse is to be analyzed and understood. How do we, for instance, 
use Western concepts to define and interrogate African culture, when it is clear that 
culture results from human interpretations of the natural environment, yet, 
environments differ? It is here that we find Oruka’s most important contribution - 
charting future possibilities for a philosophy in Africa. Below we turn to this. 
 
The African Philosophical landscape 
The discussion of how the African philosophical landscape looks like is a reflection of 
the way various thinkers have attempted to define ad situate African philosophy. 
This is easily understood if one reflects on theoris in African philosophy. These 
theories cover and determine in a significant way not only the culture of philosophy, 
but also the direction that African philosophy takes. Suffice it to say that these 
theories are defined and characterized by the two significant events that have all along 
determined discourse on African philosophy, namely, Western discourse on Africa 
and African reaction to the same (Masolo 1994, 1). 
 
These theories also attempt to cover the paradigmatc and methodological issues 
involved in conceptualizing and practicing African philosophy. A discussion of these 
theories is an attempt at articulating the nature of African philosophy. Oruka 
observes: “The expression ‘African Philosophy’ often calls forth the question ‘what is 
African philosophy?’ In an attempt … to demonstrate examples of African 
philosophical thought, various proposals and findings have sprung up” (Oruka 1990 , 
13). 
 
Overall, discourse on African philosophy rests on two broad perspectives of 
interpretation. The first draws from the principle of essentialism, namely, that there is 
a set of attributes which are necessary to the identity and function of a given group or 
entity. Essentialists hold that a member of a specific group may possess other 
characteristics that are needed neither to establish its membership nor preclude its 
membership, but that essences do not simply reflect ways of grouping objects; they 
also result in properties of the object, as the object can be subjugated to smaller 
contexts (Cartwright 1968, 615-626). This defines African philosophy in opposition to 
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Western philosophy, the implication being that there are certain values found in 
Western philosophy that are totally lacking in African philosophy. The inference here 
is that African Philosophy is radically un-European. 
 
The second perspective of interpretation defines African philosophy from a 
Universalist perspective. The simple requirement is that what is true of philosophy 
elsewhere is equally true of philosophy in Africa. The view here is that although 
cultural categories may influence philosophical priorities, by its very nature 
philosophy is a universal human exercise where indiv duals reflect upon reality. Thus 
according to this viewpoint, the method and not the content defines what passes, or 
fails to pass, as philosophical. 
 
It is from the first perspective above that the racial ideology was introduced into 
African philosophy in a formal way. Of course it lingered in the sociological past of 
Africa. The responses to that perspective, including taking universalist positions, have 
all failed to achieve their objective, since they allow the prism of investigation to be 
modeled by racial considerations. To what extent did this racial chauvinism influence 
ethnophilosophers? (see Oruka 1990, 5-6). 
 
Martha Nussbaum (1997, 6-7) warns against several kinds of vices that infect and 
influence comparative analysis, among which is the kind of methodological 
procedures or dispositions present when dealing with cultures that are not one’s own. 
Descriptive chauvinism, she says, consists in recreating the other tradition in the 
image of one’s own (Nussbaum 1997, 34). This is reading a text from another 
tradition and assuming that it asks the same questions or constructs responses or 
answers in a similar manner as the one with which one is most familiar. In descriptive 
chauvinism, ethnophilosophers recreated African thoug t systems and traditions in the 
image of the West, in order to make them comprehensible to a Western audience. 
Here the assumption was that African philosophy constructs responses and answers in 
a way similar to Western philosophy. Difference in outlook led the West to dismiss 
Africa as a place of philosophical unanimity and lacking in critical inquiry, because 
Africans were not pursuing the same kinds of analysis as Westerners in their 
philosophical inquiries. 
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Normative chauvinism is the view that one’s tradition is the best, and that insofar as 
the others are different, they are inferior or in error. The lesson here is that in 
reflecting, a philosopher should only hold those viws that are most defensible and 
credible. However, because philosophers are human beings, the criteria for what is 
defensible may be tradition-dependent. If one is unwilli g to revisit one’s own criteria 
in the light of another tradition, one may find oneself committed to little else other 
than a form of normative chauvinism. The most common f rm of normative 
chauvinism is the belief that unless philosophy is done in a certain kind of way (for 
example, rational, critical, reflective and logical argumentation), it cannot properly be 
regarded as philosophy. 
 
In line with normative chauvinism, ethno philosophers molded a paradigm in which 
the Western philosophical tradition was the best, and in so far as others are different 
they are inferior or have a mistaken view of reality. In this ethnophilosophy relied on 
a criterion that was too tradition depended to make decisions on and concerning 
African thought. This robbed it of its credibility and defensibility, especially with the 
rise of new trends in African philosophy. What is important to note is that 
ethnophilosophers refused or were unwilling to re-examine their own theoretical 
framework in the light of African realities. For the ethnophilosophers, unless 
philosophical reflection is undertaken following the parameters of the West, it cannot 
be considered as philosophy. To date, when many Europeans visit departments of 
Philosophy in Africa, they expect to be told about African culture rather than 
philosophy. The latter, they believe, is absent. 
 
In Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy (1990), Oruka identifies six theories 
in African philosophy. Of these, four are significant (Oruka 1990, 13-20), while the 
remaining two are subsidiary to the discourse on African philosophy. The six are: 
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1. Ethno philosophy. 
2. Professional African philosophy. 
3. Sage philosophy. 
4. Nationalistic-Ideological philosophy. 
5. Literary- artistic philosophy. 
6. Hermeneutical theory in African philosophy. 
 
Ethno-philosophy 
As earlier noted, this theory can be traced to Placide Tempels. Ethno-philosophy is a 
system of thought that deals with collective worldviews of diverse African peoples as 
a unified form of knowledge that is based on myths, folklore, palaver and proverbs. 
This theory is based on the assumption that African philosophy is structurally and 
methodologically different from Western Philosophy. According to this theory, it is 
this difference that confers some uniqueness on African philosophy, and that this 
unique nature can be demonstrated. It considers African philosophy as the set of 
values, rituals, beliefs and ideals that are implicit in the language of African peoples. 
The assumption by most, if not all, ethnophilosophers is that every culture is 
organized around a set of philosophical principles that are manifested in its language, 
beliefs and practices regardless of whether this is explicitly stated by any member of 
that culture. Placide Tempels and Alexis Kagame in particular hold that the linguistic 
categories of the Bantu people reflect their metaphysical categories, which in turn 
shape their view of reality. 
 
The ethnophilosophical assumption that there is an essential difference between 
Western and African thought implied that there are some essential differences 
between the two mentalities, classifying them into distinct camps, on the one hand, a 
powerful and conquering West, and on the other, an Africa that is submissive, 
mystical and almost lacking in logos. The West is the prototype centre, defining every 
value that is attributable to human-ness, including reason, logic and science. 
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Besides Placide Tempels, ethnophilosophy has found expression in the works of two 
groups of thinkers. First, we have academics such as J.S. Mbiti (1969), Alexis 
Kagame (1956), and Marcel Griaule (1965). Second, in some instances, the works of 
statesmen such as Kwame Nkrumah (1970), Julius K Nyerere (1968; 1974) and 
Leopold Sedar Senghor (1962) are also included. Despite the efforts of the members 
of the first group to pioneer African philosophical discourse, they have received an 
unfair amount of criticism, which the second group has been spared. The former have 
been accused of smuggling anthropological approaches into African philosophy, 
which is essentially descriptive and lacks the analytic power that every truly 
philosophical work carries. Interestingly, while the latter engage in a similar exercise, 
they have been characterized as champions of African cultural values and dignity, that 
is, they are regarded as the cultural nationalists out to liberate Africa from the 
bondage of Western imperialism. 
 
Professional African Philosophy 
This consists of works by trained scholars of philosophy in Africa. It also includes 
works and writings by Africanists and Black Africans in the diaspora. Most of these 
reject ethno philosophy as an approach to the study of African philosophy. They hold 
that philosophy is a universal discipline and that for any piece of work to qualify as 
philosophical, it must meet the acceptable criteria, among them, that any philosophy 
ought to be critical, self reflective and logical. However, they equally acknowledge 
that it is possible to have great dissimilarities in philosophical priorities and traditions 
that are occasioned by differences in culture. All in all, Professional African 
philosophers grant the existence of African philosophy as a body of works produced 
by Africans in any area and tradition as meeting the threshold of philosophy. 
 
Some of the African professional philosophers are very hostile to ethnophilosophy 
(see Hountondji 1996, 33). In particular, Hountondji’s definition of African 
philosophy has been cited as the most radical. The demand that African philosophy 
should be a “set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described 
as philosophic by their[sic] authors themselves” (Ibid.) has been seen as creating 
unnecessary and extra qualifications to the practice of philosophy in Africa. In 
Hountondji’s words, his goal is: 
Race Ideology and the Conceptualization of Philosophy from Placide Tempels to Odera Oruka 157 
 
To circumscribe this literature, to define its main themes, to show what 
it’s problematic has been … and to call it into question. These aims 
will have been achieved if we succeed in convincing our African 
readers that African philosophy does not lie where we have long been 
looking for it, in some mysterious corner of our supposedly immutable 
soul, a collective and unconscious world view which it is incumbent on 
us to study and revive but that our philosophy consists essentially in 
the process of analysis itself, in that very discourse through which we 
have been doggedly attempting to define ourselves - a discourse, 
therefore, which we must recognize as ideological and which it is now 
up to us to liberate, in the most political sense of the word, in order to 
equip ourselves with a truly theoretical discourse which will be 
indissolubly philosophical and scientific (Hountondji 1996, 33). 
In line with Hountondji’s outlook, Wiredu (1980, 13-25) argued that traditional 
philosophy in Africa should not be taken as the paradigm for African philosophy just 
as no one in their right mind can hold traditional Western philosophy as the model for 
contemporary Western philosophy. 
 
The contribution of professional African philosophers has been immense at all levels - 
methodology, style, language, critique, and in the creation of a written history within 
African philosophy. 
Sage Philosophy 
This theory, traceable to H. Odera Oruka, is a reflective system of thought that is 
based on the wisdom of individual African men and women. The gist of this theory is 
the claim that although there were no professional philosophers in the academic sense 
in traditional Africa, it had men and women of wisdom who fulfilled both the 
professional and social functions associated with philosophy, namely, the analytic and 
prescriptive. Oruka introduced philosophic sagacity to the international community in 
1978 during a conference held in Commemoration of Dr Antony William Amo in 
Accra, Ghana. He stated: 
Sage philosophy consists of the expressed thoughts of wise men and 
women in any given community and is a way of thinking and 
explaining the world that fluctuates between popular wisdom and 
didactic wisdom…. While popular wisdom is often conformist, 
didactic wisdom is at times critical of the communal set up and popular 
wisdom (Oruka 1991, 33; Oruka 1997, 181-182). 
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It is the view of this paper that the distinction that is often made between folk and 
philosophic sages is not that watertight (Oruka 1991, 33-36). Perhaps this is explained 
by the fact that many times people do not understand hat what is seen as folk wisdom  
was once the didactic wisdom of a respected sage before it lapsed into common 
knowledge. Similarly, it is noteworthy that all philosophers are not didactic on 
everything in society. One may be very good at moral matters while quite ignorant on 
social matters. This theory seems to be the least appreciated within African 
philosophy (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2007, 17). Strangely, it is the most criticized theory 
after ethno philosophy.  
From Sage Philosophy to philosophic sagacity 
An interesting perspective has emerged in African philosophy in which it is claimed 
that everything African and philosophical, and all that is philosophical and African, is 
reducible to Philosophic sagacity. Prof Ochieng’-Odhiambo advanced this argument 
in a paper titled “The Tripartite in Philosophic Sagacity” (2006). He holds that the 
concept of philosophic sagacity is actually not new, since Oruka himself used it in his 
early works. He identifies three stages in the evoluti n of sage philosophy 
representing the periods pre-1978, 1978 to 1983, and 1984-1995. 
 
In the first phase, pre-1978, sagacity was used to refer to philosophy in its normative 
rather than in its technical and theoretical sense. The view was that there existed 
African philosophers in the same way Socrates was a philosopher without writing 
anything down or expressing serious opinion on discourse about nature and reality. 
 
In the second phase spanning 1978-1983, Oruka is concerned with explicating the 
notion of Sagacity in African philosophy, explaining that sagacity in African thought 
should be distinguished from traditional wisdom, which is a collective participatory 
activity. In this case, sagacity is the critical initiative of responsible individuals 
(Oruka 1990, 47-48). It is useful to point out that this period witnessed the softening 
of heart towards ethnophilosophy, as it is seen as one of the trends or theories that 
could be used to explain African philosophy. For Oruka, ethnophilosophy is 
acceptable because of its explanatory power with regard to the nature of philosophy in 
Africa (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2002, 34). Ochieng’-Odhiambo’s assessment is based on 
Oruka’s own position that “…between the folk-philosophy and the written critical 
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discourse, sage philosophy comes as the third altern tive: it demonstrates the fact that 
traditional Africa had both, folk-wisdom and critical individualized philosophical 
discourse” (Oruka 1990, 65). Oruka is at pains to assert the potential role of sagacity 
in creating a critical philosophy as a theoretical discipline with not only the normative 
function but also the critical, epistemological and logical functions of philosophy. 
 
The post-1983 phase witnesses another shift by Oruka f om philosophic sagacity back 
to sage philosophy. In a paper titled “Sagacity in Development” (Oruka 1990, 57-65), 
a clear meaning is delineated with regard to philosophic sagacity. He uses sagacity 
specifically to imply the wisdom of named specific individuals (Oruka 1990, 57). It is 
in this last period that Oruka makes attempts at distinguishing the various usages of 
the idea of sagacity as being at the core of any future efforts in the practice of 
philosophy in Africa. 
 
A careful reading of these developments reveal two main issues regarding the 
relationship between philosophy and sagacity in African philosophy. First, sagacity 
can refer to popular wisdom in which the community claims ownership, which 
implies that no particular individual is responsible for its truth claim: this could be 
written or oral. Second, the term sagacity could refer to the didactic wisdom of known 
individuals who claim ownership and are responsible for the ideas, and are able to 
rationally defend their truth claims. For Oruka, it is in the second conception that 
African philosophy lay, since to recognize and affirm African wisdom is to implicitly 
recognize and affirm the existence of individuals in Africa who hold this wisdom, 
hence pointing to the existence of African philosophers. 
 
What is important now is to identify these philosophers. Moreover, the issue is no 
longer whether African philosophy in this sense exists, but to cultivate a history of 
discursive thought among African peoples. This task has been left to contemporary 
thinkers, both Africans and Africanists, trained and committed to the cause and future 
of African philosophy (Masolo 1994, 194). The task has predictably been taken over 
by professional African philosophers, some of whom were very critical of Oruka 
(Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2002, 26-31, 34). 
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In all the three stages, it seems that Oruka was too preoccupied with situating African 
philosophy among black Africans. He neither made attempts to reconcile the 
inconsistencies in the project, nor even recognized them, a point that is partly 
responsible for the misunderstandings and misrepresntations about sage philosophy. 
What Oruka was interested in was the rebuttal against ethnophilosophy, and to 
demonstrate that “African mythologies should not besubstituted for African 
philosophy” (Graness & Kresse eds. 1997, 34) 
Shades of Philosophic Sagacity 
Ochieng-Odhiambo has identified what he calls shades of philosophic sagacity, 
contending that the entire discourse in African philosophy can be explained through 
the prism of any of the shades. These shades are acdemic, cultural-nationalist and 
epistemic (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2006, 24-30). Below we bri fly look at these shades. 
 
The Academic shade 
This represents the intellectual confrontation betwe n ethnophilosophy and 
professional philosophy on the question of the definition of African philosophy. 
Technically, this was an easy escape route that provided the then budding African 
philosophers with a punching bag in the absence of any credible philosophical 
literature. The immediate impact of this shade was to leave a trail of literature that is 
so critical of ethno philosophy to the extent of making unrealistic demands concerning 
the nature of African philosophy (Hountondji 1996, 45-47). The demand for a 
philosophy for Africa during this period was made by individuals who were critical 
about the elements and dynamics of culture. 
 
The Cultural- Nationalist shade 
This focuses on post independent African societies, and especially on the question of 
the negative impact of Western culture on Africa. According to Ochieng-Odhiambo 
(2006, 21), the second phase in Oruka’s research on sage philosophy underpins this 
thought. This effectively takes over the role previously performed by ideological-
nationalistic theory. It advocates for African nationalism at the local cultural level, as 
well as at the national and continental levels, in which there is a progressive 
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modernizing of African ideologies, values and institutions, within the framework of 
African culture (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2006; Presbey 1999). 
 
The Epistemic Shade 
This is concerned with the preservation of traditional knowledge in Africa through the 
interpretive competency of trained researchers in ph losophy. It focuses on traditional 
cultural themes, practices, and the cognitive structu es underlying them. It inquires 
into forms of knowledge creation and validation, as well as techniques for appraising 
moral issues in society. This aspect of philosophic sagacity is involved in the 
generation and sustaining of discussions on African themes through texts that reflect 
this reality. Sages are engaged on ethical as well as empirical issues as they occur and 
influence social practice. The trouble with this shade is its over reliance on 
mythologies. It is not clear what aspects of myths have cognitive value and which 
ones do not. 
 
Nationalist-Ideological Philosophy 
Oruka called the fourth theory that he identified ‘Nationalist Ideological philosophy’. 
This has its basis in the presupposition that a true philosophy for Africa should be 
founded on a clear social theory that tries to explain the African conditions. If the 
assumption is granted, the works of various African political thinkers who formulated 
ideologies for liberating Africa should suffice to explain these conditions. For these 
thinkers, African culture, and consequently African philosophy, can only be revived 
on the basis of a truly free and humanist reorganization of African society. For Oruka, 
the main players here include Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed 
Ben Bella, Sekou Toure, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Kenneth Kaunda, among others.  
 
It is our view that these thinkers sought to create an African philosophy that was 
unique, hence the claims of a unique African Socialism by J.K. Nyerere (1968 & 
1974). This is a keen to the efforts of ethnophilosophers to delineate a unique African 
philosophy, and no wonder it has achieved very little. Thus Nyerere over-emphasized 
those factors that make Africans unique, and insisted that in African Socialism, one 
can find an African contribution to universal civilzation. It is worth noting that 
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nationalist-ideological literature interrogated both ideology in Africa, as well as the 
existential position of the African as a race and the liberation of Africa from racial 
bondage. It has been observed that quite frequently these efforts did not crystallize 
into a clear social theory defined by objective principles. 
 
Nationalist-ideological philosophy continues to form the core of the culture of 
philosophical discourse in Africa. By the time Oruka published his seminal paper 
“Four Trends in Current African Philosophy” (1978), the emphasis was on the four 
theories outlined above. Nevertheless, he later talked of two other theories, namely, 
Hermeneutic and Literary artistic philosophy. These two, particularly the latter, have 
received very little attention. Below we attempt a brief outline of them. 
 
Hermeneutics in African Philosophy 
Hermes, in Greek mythology, was the messenger of the gods, the son of the god Zeus 
and of Maia, the daughter of the Titan Atlas. As the special courier of Zeus, Hermes 
had winged sandals and a winged hat, and bore a golden Caduceus, or magic wand, 
entwined with snakes and surmounted by wings. He conducted the souls of the dead 
to the underworld, and was believed to possess magical powers over sleep and 
dreams. Hermes was also the god of commerce, and the protector of traders and herds. 
As the deity of athletes, he protected gymnasiums and stadiums, and was believed to 
be responsible for both good luck and wealth. Despit  h s virtuous characteristics, 
Hermes was also a dangerous foe, a trickster, and a thief. In one version of a 
characteristic tale, on the day of his birth he stole he cattle of his brother, the sun god 
Apollo, obscuring their trail by making the herd walk backward. When confronted by 
Apollo, Hermes denied the theft. The brothers were finally reconciled when Hermes 
gave Apollo his newly invented lyre. Hermes was represented in early Greek art as a 
mature, bearded man; in classical art he became an athletic youth, nude and beardless 
(Microsoft Encarta 2009). It is from this mythology that Hermeneutics derives its 
name as a special messenger and the interpreter of god’s message (Serequeberhan 
1994, 1). 
 
This theory holds that since African culture consists in myths, a social worldview, 
religion, proverbs, poetry, and all other oral or witten literary works, African 
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philosophy should be the interpretation of these. Hre, the emphasis is on the fact that 
philosophy is culturally determined, and is a form of wisdom. Here philosophy takes 
lived experiences as its starting point; and since th  lived experiences of most 
Africans revolve around the struggle to cope with cultural, political and economic 
imperialism, African philosophy should seek ways and means of liberating Africans 
from these through interpretation. Worldviews, proverbs and all other forms of 
cultural wisdom on their own are not useful. Their r levance is predicated on their 
ability to contribute to achieving this liberation goal for African societies. Reading 
into this theory one is surprised at the apologetic nature of its assumptions as outlined 
below: 
1. All the research and literature on African Philosophy has used the wrong 
methodology. 
2. These researches have failed to understand the exact nature of philosophy as 
the study of wisdom within or of a given culture, in this case, African. 
3. Therefore, given that philosophy is the study of human wisdom and European 
philosophy is the study of European wisdom, African philosophy is the study 
of African wisdom.  
 
We wish to make some observations concerning these as umptions. First, the theory 
is not clear on the meaning and nature of wisdom. Wisdom is used in such a loose 
sense that it becomes difficult to pinpoint exactly what African or European wisdom 
means in each instance. By assuming that wisdom is def ned solely by use of cultural 
parameters, and that particular cultures give forth a specific and unique form of 
wisdom applicable within that cultural environment, this theory deprives philosophy 
of its essential nature: application of reason to understanding the natural and social 
environment. This limits significantly the effectiveness of philosophy as a rational 
exercise that is not confined to cultural demands and peculiarities. As we said earlier, 
this does not in any way negate the role of culture in shaping the course of a 
philosophy. According to Wiredu, we are all children of our circumstances (Wiredu 
1980, 36). Nevertheless, this does not give culture the sole right to determine 
philosophical ingredients and tools such as logic and r tionality.  
164 Francis E.A. Owakah 
 
 
We hasten to add however that holding the view that p ilosophy is the work of pure 
reason contemplating upon eternal truths within and relevant to a particular culture is 
perverted if not misguided. Truth is neither White nor Black, European nor African. If 
truth were to be subject to the contingencies of cultures, it would reduce philosophy to 
shifting human opinions. Again, we are not here denying the role and influence of 
individuals in the development of a philosophy. We ar equally not denying the role 
of culture in the development of philosophy. All tha  we are saying is that throughout 
the world, the direction of a philosophy is determined by the ability and effectiveness 
with which philosophers within a particular culture are able to reflect on existing 
values and forms of knowledge, confirming, rearranging and rejecting those that have 
ceased to be relevant (Wiredu 1980, 1). Understanding the demands of changing 
cultural behavior is the goal of philosophy. 
 
The above comments notwithstanding, the works of Tsenay Serequeberhan (1991, 
1994), Marcien Towa (1971), V.Y. Mudimbe (1988, 1994) , and to a lesser extent  
Lansana Keita (1985) are all often considered to bel ng to this category. What is 
interesting is that apart from Serequeberhan (1991, 1 94), the rest do not proclaim 
their link to this theory. 
 
The Literary Artistic     Approach 
This is the sixth and final theory in Oruka’s account of the landscape of philosophy in 
Africa. It has received the least attention. One will find it hardly being mentioned in 
academic fora, only receiving passing attention in classes on African Philosophy (See 
Oruka 1991, 5). 
 
This theory conceives African philosophy in terms of creative African writings 
(novels, plays, poems, etc.)  and other artistic productions, with special reference to 
the perennial question of the relationship between Western and traditional African 
culture, in which the former is dominant. The claim here is that writing about African 
societies using fiction portrays the truth about African peoples, culture and thought 
patterns.  
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To illustrate the approach of this theory, let us take George Orwell’s acclaimed novel, 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). It is dystopian in nature. This is speculation about a 
fictional society that is in some important way undesirable or frightening. Writing in 
1949, he speculates about how our world would probably have degenerated and how 
it would look like in 1984! We are introduced to a global political monolith headed by 
Big Brother, who justifies his rule in the name of s me supposed greater good. Today 
this has come to pass. What with America’s Big Brother arrogant propaganda in the 
name of Foreign policy geared towards global supervision and historical revisionism.  
 
It is our view that in broad terms, metaphysical speculation undertakes systematic 
reflection with the object being very clear and independent of the inquirer. On the 
other hand, fictional speculation and other works of art are sometimes conceived in a 
void and are actually the creation of the author, a kind of recasting of reality. To this 
extent, fiction should not find its way into African  philosophy. Let fiction form a 
different genre of works in African literary efforts, but not specifically philosophy. 
Philosophy is about taxing the mind to produce ideas on and about the universe, 
humanity, and God. Its speculative approach in metaphysics should not be confused 
with fiction. Metaphysics has a direct link to the d velopment of culture, science and, 
in particular, progress in technology. Though fiction does deal with humanity, God, 
and the universe, the rigor of philosophical inquiry cannot be found in these efforts. 
Suffice it to add that we are not in any way denying literary scholars the benefit of 
philosophical honor. All that we are saying is that a few of these who rise to the level 
of philosophical reflection should be recognized for their efforts as philosophers 
besides their endeavors as creative writers. 
 
Concluding Remarks       
Our overarching goal has been to reflect on the path philosophy in Africa has 
traversed from Placide Tempels to Odera Oruka, and how this has been influenced by 
racial ideology. Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy ascribed a less rigorous 
communal type of philosophy to Africa, resulting in a philosophy of anonymity 
without men and women who could stand up to defend its truth claims. The basis of 
this is racism - the belief that Africans are structurally and methodologically different 
from western thinkers (Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2009, 65-6; Masolo 1994, 1-12). 
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Hountondji’s prescription on the other hand is heavily informed by racial ideology, as 
he clearly determines those qualified to participate in discourse on African philosophy 
on racial grounds (Hountondji 1996, 33-35). Appiah (1992) adopts a middle ground, 
in which though the ideology is still racial, we witness a new discourse on race and 
culture taking a Universalist narrative. Wiredu (1980) and Mudimbe (1988) take a 
rationalist position, but the framework remains racial in nature. Oruka takes a 
reconciliatory stance: he is not entirely Afro-centric. His position is that rationality, 
logic and beauty are not racially defined and are not a monopoly of any one given 
race, so that racial superiority cannot be validly nferred from such considerations. His 
advice is to let rationality define the course of philosophy in Africa. For him, , though 
rebellious discourse by Africans as a way of counteri g Western imperialism and 
cultural domination was necessary, it could not define the practice of philosophy in 
Africa. He clearly recognizes that philosophy in Africa originated and has developed 
through a cultural framework that is alien, and that indigenous philosophies in Africa 
require a cultural basis that is African in values, interpretation, and the possibility of 
creating an epistemological basis for this interpretation. 
 
References 
Abraham, William E. 1962. The Mind of Africa. Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press. 
Appiah, K. Anthony. 1992. In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of 
Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bodunrin, Peter. 1981. "The Question of African Philosophy". Philosophy, Vol.56, 
pp.161-179. 
Cartwright, R.L. 1968. "Some Remarks on Essentialism". The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol.65 No.20, pp.615–626. 
Erassov, Boris. 1972. "Concepts of ‘Cultural Personality: The Ideologies of the Third 
World". Diogenes, Vol.78, pp.123-140. 
Eze, Emmanuel ed. 1997. Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. 
Oxford: Blackwel. 
Goody, Jack, 1977. The Domestication of the Savage Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Griaule, Marcel. 1965. Conversations with Ogotemmeli. Trans by Dieu. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hacking, Ian. 1973. Why Does Language Matter To Philosophy? Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
--. 1996. "Does It Matter Whether Linguistic Philosophy Intersects Ethno 
philosophy?" American Philosophical Association Newsletter, Vol. 96 No.1, 
pp. 136-140. 
Race Ideology and the Conceptualization of Philosophy from Placide Tempels to Odera Oruka 167 
 
--. 1997. "African Meanings, Western Words". African Studies Review, Vol.40 No.1, 
pp.1-11. 
Hegel, G.W.F. 1975. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hollis, Martin & Steven Lukes eds. 1982. Rationality and Relativism. Oxford: 
Blackwell.   
Hountondji, Paulin. 1983 & 1996. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Kagame, A., 1956. La Philosophie bantu-rwandaise de lꞌẽtr . Bruxelles: Acadẽmie 
Royale de Sciences Coloniales.  
Kresse, Kai & Anke Graness eds. 1997. Sagacious Reasoning: Henry Odera Oruka in 
Memoriam. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
Keita, Lansana. 1985. “ Contemporary African Philosophy”. The Search for a 
Method. Praxis International. Vol. 5, No. 2, July, pp. 145-161. 
Masolo, D.A. 1994. African Philosophy In Search of Identity. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
--. 2010. Self and Community in a Changing World. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Mbiti, John S, 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. 
Mudimbe, V.Y. 1985. ‘African Gnosis: Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge’. 
African Studies Review. Vol. 28, Nos. 2-3, June- September , pp. 149-231. 
--. 1988. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
--. 1991. Parables and Fables: Exegesis, Textuality and Politics in Central Africa. 
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
--. 1994. The Idea of Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Nkrumah, Kwameh. 1970. Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for 
Decolonization and Development with Particular Refer nce to the African  
 Revolution. London: Panaf Books. 
Nyerere, J.K. 1968. Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford. 
--. 1974.  Man and Development. London: Oxford University Press.  
Nussbaum, Martha, 1997. Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in 
Liberal Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Ochieng’-Odhiambo, 1994. “The Significance of Philosophic Sagacity in African 
Philosophy.” Unpublished PhD, Thesis, University of Nairobi. 
--. 1997. African Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. Nairobi: Consolata Institute of 
Philosophy. 
--. 2002. “The Evolution of Sagacity: The Three Stages of Oruka’s Philosophy”. 
Philosophia Africana, Vol.5 No.1, pp.25-38. 
--. 2006. “The Tripartite in Philosophic Sagacity”. Philosophia Africana, Vol.9 No.1, 
pp.17-34. 
Okere, T. 1983. A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of Its 
Possibility. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 
Okolo, Okonda, 1991. "Tradition and Destiny: Horizons of an African Philosophical 
Hermeneutics". In Tsenay Serequeberhan, ed. African Philosophy: The 
Essential Readings. New York: Paragon House. 
--. 1994. The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizons and Discourse. New 
York: Rutledge. 
168 Francis E.A. Owakah 
 
Oruka, H. Odera, 1975. "The Fundamental Principles in the Question of African 
Philosophy". Second Order Vol.4, pp.44-55. 
--. 1978. “Four Trends in Current African Philosophy”. A Paper Presented to the 16th 
World Congress of Philosophy. Dusseldorf, West Germany.  
--. 1981."Four Trends in African Philosophy". In Alwin Diemer, ed. Philosophy in the 
Present Situation of Africa. Weisbaden, Germany: Franz Steiner Erlagh.  
--. 1990. Trends in Conteporary African Philosophy. Nairobi: Shirikon Publishers. 
--. 1991. Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and the Modern Debate on African 
Philosophy. Nairobi: ACTS Press. 
--. 1997. Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimu . Nairobi: East 
African Educational Publishers. 
Oruka, H.O. & D. A. Masolo eds. 1983. Philosophy and Culture. Nairobi: Bookwise 
Publishers. 
Orwell, George. 1949. Nineteen Eighty-Four: The Facsimile Manuscript. London: 
Secker & Warburg.  
Oseghare, Anthony, 1992. "Sagacity and African Philosophy". International 
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol.32/1, No.125, pp.95-103. 
Pearce, Carol, 1992. "African Philosophy and the Sociol gical Thesis". Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences Vol.22 No.4, pp.440-460. 
Presbey, Gail M., 1999. "The Wisdom of African Sages". New Political Science 
Special Issue, the Dimensions of African Philosophy: Ethics, Politics, and 
Culture 
Senghor, Leopold Sedar. 1962. Nationhood and the Road to Socialism. Paris: 
Presence Africaine. 
Serequeberhan, Tsenay,1994. The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy. London: 
Rutledge. 
--. 1991. African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. New York: Paragon House. 
Soyinka, Wole. 1976. Myth, Literature and the African World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Taiwo, Olufemi, 1993. "Colonialism And Its Aftermath: The Crisis of Knowledge 
Production". Callaloo: A Journal of African American and African Arts and 
Letters. Vol.16 No.4, pp.891-908. 
Tempels, Placide. 1959. Bantu Philosophy, Paris, Présence Africaine. 
Wamba-Dia-Wamba, Ernest. 1991. "Philosophy in Africa: Challenges of the African 
Philosopher". In Tsenay Serequeberhan, ed. African Philosophy: The Essential 
Readings. New York: Pragon House 
Wiredu, Kwasi. 1980. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
--. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
--. 1991. "On Defining African Philosophy". In Tsenay Serequeberhan, ed. African 
Philosophy: The Essential Readings. New York: Paragon House. 
